- EC Investigates Provision of Aftermarket Services
- UK FCA Proposes Settlement of Rooftop Lease Arrangements Investigation
- UK CMA Provides Guidance and Case Study on Labour Market Agreements
- Belgium Investigates Limitation of Bicycle Gear Ratio
EC Investigates Provision of Aftermarket Services
On 25 September 2025, the European Commission (EC) announced an investigation into SAP’s activities in the provision of maintenance and support services for its enterprise resource planning (ERP) software. The EC will assess whether SPA infringed EU competition law by distorting competition in that aftermarket.
ERP software supports business functions such as managing corporate finances, human resources and project management. SAP provides services on premises (software runs on the customer’s own servers) or via cloud (software hosted on SAP’s servers and delivered over the internet).
SAP also provides maintenance and support for its ERP software, which includes regular updates and technical assistance for its business customers to keep the software operational.
On a preliminary basis, the EC considers that SAP holds a dominant position in the on-premises aftermarket for its ERP software. The EC says third-party companies also provide these services and compete with SAP “often [on the basis of] better commercial conditions, such as price.”
The EC will investigate whether SAP restricted competition from these third-party providers through various practices. It will also consider whether these practices amount to exploitative conduct vis-à-vis its customers, which could amount to abuses of SAP’s dominant position.
SAP’s practices that the EC will investigate are:
- Requiring customers to seek maintenance and support services from SAP for all SAP on-premises ERP software and choose the same type of maintenance and support under the same pricing conditions for all SAP on-premises ERP software. According to the EC, these requirements may prevent customers from “mixing and matching” maintenance and support services from different suppliers at different price and support levels despite it being more convenient to do so.
- Preventing customers from terminating maintenance and support services for unused software licences, which may result in SAP’s customers paying for unwanted services.
- Systematically extending the duration of the initial term of on-premises ERP licences, during which termination of maintenance and support services is not possible.
- Charging reinstatement and back-maintenance fees to customers that subscribe to SAP’s maintenance and support after a period of absence. In some cases, these fees correspond to the amount customers would have paid if they had stayed with SAP all along.
The case should be of general interest to any supplier of a product or service in a primary market that also provides service, support or spare parts for that product or service in the aftermarket. Even if the supplier is not dominant in the primary market, it can be dominant in a separate aftermarket relating to its products or services. Suitable competition compliance measures and training should be implemented.
UK FCA Proposes Settlement of Rooftop Lease Arrangements Investigation
On 5 September 2025, the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) requested comments on proposed commitments to settle a UK competition law investigation concerning access to the rooftop of a building in London.
The FCA is the UK financial services regulator. It also has powers to enforce UK competition law regarding the provision of financial services in the UK and the provision of claims management services in Great Britain.
The investigation relates to the supply of low latency connectivity services (LLCS) between the London Stock Exchange (LSE) trading venue in London and two competing trading venues in the UK. LLCS providers build and operate high-speed connections between trading venues, which allow trading firms to process trades very quickly. To maximise the speed of their connections, providers place radio units as close as possible to trading venues. LSE provides LLCS on the routes between its trading venue and the other two venues.
LSE has exclusive rights under its lease to locate LLCS radio units on the rooftop of its trading building. The FCA is concerned that these rights, as well as LSE’s rooftop policy at the building, prevent rival LLCS providers from installing equipment on the rooftop, favouring LSE’s own LLCS and hindering competition. The potential concerns arise under the UK rules banning abuse of dominance (concerning the rooftop policy) and banning anticompetitive agreements (concerning the lease between LSE and its landlord).
To address the FCA’s concerns, LSE and the landlord proposed to end LSE’s exclusive rights to the rooftop and make an equivalent space on the rooftop available to third parties on a fair and reasonable basis. In future, LSE will only use part of the space for its LLCS equipment.
The case provides an example of competition law being applied to a lease arrangement as well as to a specific issue and market. Although it does not need to reach a definitive conclusion, the FCA describes the relevant market in its Notice of Intention to Accept Commitments as “all … sites that allow sufficiently fast access so that they can be competitive substitutes [to the rooftop of the LSE building].” The FCA did not conclude which other locations may be within the market, but given that arbitrage trading opportunities between venues can exist for microseconds, it seems likely there is no other location.
UK CMA Provides Guidance and Case Study on Labour Market Agreements
The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) continues to focus on the application of UK competition law to agreements that impact employment. It imposed fines for infringements of the law and published guidance documents to aid compliance.
The most recent guidance, aimed at “anyone involved in recruiting and retaining workers,” was published on 9 September 2025. It explains how the competition rules apply to employers when recruiting staff as well as when setting pay and working conditions. It highlights behaviours that are likely to be anticompetitive and covers benchmarking and collective bargaining.
The guidance starts by setting out two “myths” that, although the principles are well-known and accepted, the CMA clearly believes it should explain again:
- “Competition law doesn’t apply to agreements between employers about wages or working conditions — that’s an HR issue, not a business one.”
- “I’m not competing with that other company for customers, so it’s fine to agree with them how much we will pay to our staff.”
In accordance with multiple precedents, these statements are identified as “false,” and the guidance explains why.
On the same day, the CMA published “lessons” from its investigation into sports broadcasting and production companies that colluded on rates of pay for freelance workers in the UK. The CMA found that several of these companies in the UK shared sensitive information about fees for freelance workers such as camera operators and sound technicians. Fines were imposed on four companies.
The lessons include examples of the illegal exchanges, such as an email to a competitor stating, “We pay our Studio Vision Mixers £(X) per day for a 10x hour shift,” with the response, “That’s exactly the same as we pay. Good to know we are aligned there.”
The case study points out the importance of making sure relevant staff understand competition law rules and learn to recognise illegal behaviour, including when recruiting and retaining workers. It adds that company directors should ensure their companies have regular training on following competition law.
The CMA also promoted its guidance and the case study in an article in HR Magazine, in which it added five “simple steps to stay on the safe side,” beginning with the basic guidance that “Pay and other working conditions must be set independently and it should be clear to HR staff that discussing plans for pay and other working conditions with competitors is off limits.” Unilaterally giving out such commercially sensitive information, even on one occasion, can also infringe the law.
The CMA’s approach to labour market competition law infringements is similar to that at the EU level and in EU member states. There are numerous examples of enforcement, including the 11 June 2025 decision by the French competition authority (Autorité de la concurrence) fining four companies for infringing competition law by entering into no-poach agreements concerning employees. The decision also considered non-solicitation clauses in partnership contracts but took no action. The Autorité stated at the time that the decision “is the first of its kind in Europe.”
Belgium Investigates Limitation of Bicycle Gear Ratio
On 19 September 2025, the Belgian Competition Authority (BCA) announced an investigation into the International Cycling Union’s (UCI’s) adoption of a technical standard limiting the maximum gear ratio in professional road cycling events to the equivalent of a 54-tooth chainring with an 11-tooth sprocket (54×11).
The gear ratio determines the number of wheel turns per pedal turn. Ratios greater than 54×11 (e.g. 55×10) result in a faster potential bicycle speed due to increased wheel turns per pedal turn.
The investigation follows a complaint by SRAM, a manufacturer of cycling equipment. SRAM alleges that the standard is not objectively justified on safety grounds, was not adopted under sufficiently open and transparent conditions, and is likely to have immediate, discriminatory and disproportionate effects on SRAM. According to the company, this new standard distorts competition in the supply of high-performance transmission systems and in teams’ participation in professional road cycling events. It therefore alleges two different theories of harm, relating respectively to competition at the manufacturer and competitor levels.
In its press release, SRAM said “The UCI’s new Maximum Gearing Protocol is set to restrict the equipment many of you rely on to ride and race at your best. It limits choice, stifles innovation, and unfairly targets SRAM riders as well as SRAM itself.”
SRAM added in a separate release, “This restriction excludes drivetrains that exceed this threshold, primarily SRAM’s RED AXS drivetrain in a 54×10 configuration, a preferred choice for many of SRAM’s professional teams.” In addition, “SRAM is the only major manufacturer whose current pro team setup will be blocked by the new UCI regulations — regulations that hinder innovation, limit rider choice, and unfairly disadvantage SRAM riders and SRAM.”
The UCI reacted by stating in a press release that the investigation relates to what is only a test to be carried out at the 2025 Tour of Guangxi. It will “consider any changes to the regulations” only after that test and potential additional tests in 2026. Further, the rationale is purely based on “increasing rider safety,” which is “a fundamental prerogative of all sport governing bodies.”
The BCA is investigating under Belgian and EU competition law rules concerning both anticompetitive arrangements (in this case a “decision of an association of undertakings”) and abuse of dominance. The case once again tests the application of competition law to sport regulatory bodies.
The case is unusual because, instead of individual athletes or clubs relying on competition law, it is instigated by a manufacturer whose business is threatened by a change in the technical rules of a sport. It could show the way for other similar challenges.
The key issue is likely to be whether the rider safety justification is a valid and reasonable explanation for any restrictions, noting the strong commercial interests of SRAM and the riders and teams that use its equipment.
Additional EU and UK competition law news coverage can be found on McGuireWoods’ Insights page. McGuireWoods also publishes legal alerts on U.S. antitrust developments and numerous other topics.