Congressional Investigations Monitor

White House Counsel Warns of Constitutional Limitations as Congressional Democrats Prepare for Oversight

  • Within days of the midterm elections, incoming Democratic committee leaders previewed an aggressive investigative agenda and potential subpoena targets. White House Counsel William O. Scharf responded with a letter to Representative Robert Garcia, the expected chair of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, asserting that certain investigative conduct “may cross the line into blatant criminality.” Rep. Garcia responded that congressional Democrats “will not be deterred.” A week later, Scharf followed up with a second letter addressed to Democratic ranking members of the House and Senate, stating that the Executive Branch will not accommodate their current information requests because ranking members lack oversight authority, and requests made in the current 119th Congress will not carry over to the 120th.
  • The exchange signals an adversarial posture between the Administration and the 120th Congress, which convenes on Jan. 3, 2027, but it also highlights several important considerations for private entities and individuals facing scrutiny in the new Congress:
    • The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Congress has broad implied investigative authority consistent with its Article I legislative function, but the justices have also articulated limits on that authority.
    • While the Executive Branch has political and constitutional tools available to push back on congressional oversight, achieving actual judicial constraints on congressional investigatory power remains difficult. Litigation over congressional subpoenas, however, is possible, and such judicial review may affect the course of a congressional investigation.
    • Private entities and individuals under congressional investigation may find themselves caught in this tug-of-war between Congress and the Executive Branch; they should be thoughtful in how they navigate it.

On Nov. 9, 2026, White House Counsel William O. Scharf sent a three-page letter to Rep. Robert Garcia, who is expected to chair the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform when Democrats take control of the House in January. The letter articulates constitutional limits on congressional investigations and subpoenas and accuses Rep. Garcia and other congressional Democratic leaders of “evinc[ing] a clear intent to transgress” those limits. This letter is a preview of the arguments the Administration may look to make in reacting or responding to congressional oversight in the incoming Democratic-majority Congress.

Amid these interbranch disputes, private entities and individuals could get caught up in several ways and should prepare in case they face scrutiny.

Recent Exchanges Between the White House Counsel and Incoming Congressional Committee Chairs

In the hours and days following the midterm elections, senior Democratic leaders signaled an aggressive oversight agenda. Rep. Garcia’s message to “Lawyer up!” was repeated by fellow members and across social media. Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Ron Wyden posted one word: “Subpoenas,” and Sen. Ed Markey predicted that “[t]hey are going to need to plant new forests for all of the subpoenas we’ll be printing.” Democratic leaders have continued to identify areas on which Congress will focus heavily, including the business dealings of the President and his family, immigration enforcement, healthcare pricing, corporate corruption, as well as affordability and accountability.

The letter responds to these statements made by Democratic members since the Nov. 3 election by noting that it is “abundantly clear” that the forthcoming investigative process will be used “to harass and aggrandize, rather than to advance any legitimate legislative end.” The letter asserts that “threats to executive branch officials designed to deter them from public service, or process designed merely to abuse or instill fear in the recipient may cross the line into blatant criminality,” and that “issuing unlawful subpoenas with the intention of depriving citizens of their constitutional rights and privileges may warrant further investigation.”

In a Nov. 11 statement, Rep. Garcia said, “[i]t appears Donald Trump has something to hide.” He responded that Congress’s authority “comes from Article I of the Constitution, not from the permission of the White House,” and that Congress has “wide latitude” to conduct oversight as “an authority inherent in the power to legislate.” He added that Democrats “will not be deterred by baseless threats from a weaponized DOJ or from the President’s lawyers.”

On Nov. 18, 2026, Scharf sent a second letter, this time addressed to Democratic ranking members of House and Senate committees. This most recent letter from the White House Counsel responds specifically to several post-election requests from ranking members demanding documents or information from the Executive Branch and related agencies, which it characterizes as “drip[ping] with animus or pettiness.” Citing longstanding Executive Branch policy and Office of Legal Counsel opinions, this letter takes the position that individual members “including ranking members, do not have the authority to conduct oversight in the absence of a specific delegation by a full house, committee, or subcommittee.” Therefore, any ranking member requests made in the current 119th Congress “do not trigger any obligation” of accommodation. It further states that requests made in the 119th Congress will not carry over to the 120th Congress, even if their authors become chairs, noting that the Biden Administration took the same position in December 2022. The letter further emphasizes that any requests must be made “in furtherance of a legitimate legislative purpose.”

In short, this exchange demonstrates that both sides are laying out the positions they will pursue come January. Democratic leadership in the incoming majority is previewing what it intends to investigate and how, and the Administration is previewing the arguments it may make in responding (or refusing to respond) to that oversight. These positions presage meaningful clashes between the Executive Branch and Congress after Democrats take the gavels on Jan. 3, 2027. But they also highlight key considerations for private entities and individuals who may face scrutiny in the new Congress.

Congress’ Investigative Authority Is Broad, But Not Unlimited

Although the Constitution does not expressly grant Congress the power to investigate, it has long been understood that Article I’s grant of legislative power carries with it the power to investigate in aid of legislation. As Rep. Garcia notes, the U.S. Supreme Court has long held that “[t]he power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.” McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927). Congress therefore has broad latitude to conduct “inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.” Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).

At the same time, as Scharf notes, the Supreme Court also articulated limits on Congress’s investigative authority. A congressional subpoena “must serve a ‘valid legislative purpose,’” and “Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purpose of ‘law enforcement,’ because ‘those powers are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary.’” Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U.S. 848, 863 (2020) (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955)). The Supreme Court also made clear that “Congress has no ‘“general” power to inquire into private affairs and compel disclosures,’” and that “‘there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.’” Id. (quoting McGrain, 273 U.S. at 179; Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200).

These limits are real, but in practice the “legislative purpose” requirement is expansive. The Supreme Court explained that “[t]he scope of the power of inquiry … is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution,” Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959), and that “[t]o be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end result,” Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975). Lower courts have likewise observed that “while Congress need clear only a low bar to establish a valid purpose,” challengers “face a formidable bar to impeach that purpose.” Comm. on Ways & Means, U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 575 F. Supp. 3d 53, 64-65 (D.D.C. 2021), aff’d sub nom. Comm. on Ways & Means, U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 45 F.4th 324 (D.C. Cir. 2022). In other words, as a practical matter, nearly any subject on which Congress could legislate or appropriate can support an investigation.

Imposing Judicial Constraints Is Difficult, But Litigation Is Possible

In addition to describing Congress’ investigative authority, the Supreme Court has also made clear that, so long as a committee is acting within a legitimate legislative sphere, courts generally will not second-guess the motives of individual members. See Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 132; Eastland, 421 U.S. at 508-09. When the Court has articulated limits on the scope of Congress’s authority to investigate private witnesses, it has usually been in appeals of criminal contempt convictions, as in Watkins and Quinn.

Disputes over the scope of Congress’ authority therefore rarely end in a judicial ruling that limits an investigation. The Speech or Debate Clause generally bars suits seeking to enjoin a committee from issuing or enforcing a subpoena. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501-07. Civil enforcement suits brought by Congress are slow and procedurally uncertain. In Comm. on Judiciary of U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the House Judiciary Committee had Article III standing to sue to enforce its subpoena against a former White House counsel, but the matter was resolved by accommodation before the issues could develop further. It remains to be determined whether a single committee would have a cause of action and what the Supreme Court would make of these issues.

Under 2 U.S.C. § 192, a party who “willfully” refuses to comply with a valid subpoena can be prosecuted criminally, and the D.C. Circuit held that the willfulness element requires only a deliberate and intentional refusal to comply, not bad faith. United States v. Bannon, 101 F.4th 16, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2024). For a private party, this means that challenging a subpoena by declining to comply is the clearest route to obtaining judicial review of a subpoena’s validity, but it also carries criminal risk, which few are willing to bear, especially when good faith reliance on advice of counsel or on an Executive Branch instruction may not be a full defense.

There are other ways a congressional subpoena could reach the courts beyond criminal contempt. The Senate has a statutory civil enforcement mechanism under 28 U.S.C. § 1365, which is rarely used but available against private parties, and subpoena recipients and affected third parties can themselves file suit to challenge a subpoena. The January 6 investigation produced several such suits, such as former White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows’s lawsuit to block the January 6 Select Committee’s subpoenas, including one to a cellular provider for his phone records. See Meadows v. Pelosi, 639 F. Supp. 3d 62 (D.D.C. 2022) (holding that the challenged subpoenas fell within Congress’ power to investigate as they were “legitimately tied to Congress’s legislative functions”).

The recent exchanges illustrate the tools the Executive Branch may use to push back on congressional oversight, including public messaging, asserting executive privilege, and controlling the actions of federal officials who would respond to oversight requests or enforce congressional subpoenas. But for the private sector, it can be much harder to push back, and achieving actual constraints on a congressional investigation through court order is difficult and unlikely. That does not mean, however, that these disputes will stay out of court entirely. Although such challenges face an uphill climb, the difficulty of obtaining a judicial limitation does not mean filing suit lacks value. Litigation can slow an investigation, create leverage in negotiations over scope and potentially help a recipient achieve its objectives without a final ruling on the merits. Given the posture of parties on both sides of Pennsylvania Avenue, more litigation over congressional subpoenas in the 120th Congress is likely, not less.

Private Entities and Individuals May Be Caught Between Congress and the Executive

As described above, all signs point to coming confrontation over the scope of congressional oversight between the Trump Administration and the Democratic congressional majorities in the House and Senate once the 120th Congress convenes on Jan. 3, 2027.

Private parties can get caught up in an interbranch dispute in several ways. Committees frequently seek information about Executive Branch activity from third parties, such as contractors, grant recipients, financial institutions, accounting firms and regulated companies, as illustrated by the subpoenas to President Donald Trump’s accountants and lenders at issue in Mazars. A private recipient may hold communications with the White House or federal agencies over which the Executive Branch asserts privilege or may otherwise be urged by the Administration not to cooperate with requests for communications with Administration officials.

Private entities and individuals who receive congressional requests in the 120th Congress should consider the following:

Be prepared to engage and negotiate scope. Committee staff often agree to narrow requests, prioritize categories of documents or accept rolling productions. Early engagement is frequently the most effective way to reduce burden and avoid escalation to a subpoena or contempt.

Preserve objections in writing. Objections based on pertinency, scope, privilege or constitutional rights should be raised clearly and promptly when litigation is anticipated so that they are preserved for any later proceeding.

Carefully consider the Executive Branch’s position. Where requested information implicates Executive Branch equities, recipients may consider notifying the relevant agency or the White House, but an Executive Branch request or instruction not to comply does not necessarily shield a private recipient from contempt.

Protect privileges and individual rights. Congressional committees often take the position that common-law privileges, including the attorney-client privilege and work product protection, are not binding on Congress. Recipients should negotiate the treatment of privileged material in advance, and individuals should evaluate whether to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege.

Plan for the long term. Congressional investigations can generate referrals to federal agencies, parallel regulatory or criminal inquiries, and public reporting. The five-year statute of limitations for most federal offenses, including contempt of Congress, means that decisions made now may be reviewed by a future DOJ under a different presidential administration.

McGuireWoods continues to monitor these developments and their impact on businesses and individuals. For questions, contact the authors or a member of the McGuireWoods Congressional Investigations Practice Group.


This alert is part of an ongoing series from the McGuireWoods Congressional Investigations team tracking the investigative and oversight priorities heading into a new Congress.

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